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Abstract 
This paper focuses upon the relationship between the business and philanthropic endeavours 
of world-making entrepreneurs; asking why, how and to what ends these individuals seek to 
extend their reach in society beyond business. We present an original model of 
entrepreneurial philanthropy which demonstrates how investment in philanthropic projects 
can yield positive returns in cultural, social and symbolic capital, which in turn may lead to 
growth in economic capital. The model is applied to interpret and make sense of the career of 
Andrew Carnegie, whose story, far from reducing to one of making a fortune then giving it 
away, is revealed as more complex and more unified. His philanthropy raised his stock within 
the field of power, helping convert surplus funds into social networks, high social standing 
and intellectual currency, enabling him to engage in world making on a grand scale. 
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Introduction 
This article has a dual purpose. The first is to present a more complete and intellectually 
satisfying explanation than presently exists for the involvement of super-wealthy 
entrepreneurs in large-scale philanthropic ventures. Entrepreneurs who become major 
philanthropists are referred to here as entrepreneurial philanthropists, and include amongst 
their number Bill Gates, Conrad and Barron Hilton, Andrew Mellon, John D Rockefeller and 
Henry Wellcome. These individuals and others like them are distinguished both by a fierce 
drive to accumulate personal fortunes and by the desire to deploy a significant part of their 
wealth in pursuit of philanthropic ventures over which they can exercise control (Bishop and 
Green, 2008; Schervish et al., 1994). Entrepreneurial philanthropists do not see themselves as 
simply disposing of surplus funds, but rather as actively investing their resources (money, 
know-how, time, social connections, reputation and prestige) in projects that promise high 
social rates of return. They are, in other words, powerful social actors engaged in the business 
of world making (Bourdieu, 1987), which we conceive, following Creed, Scully and Austin 
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(2002: 475), as ‘the embedded ways in which agents relate to and shape systems of meaning 
and mobilize collective action to change social arrangements.’ Our second purpose is to 
demonstrate through analysis of the career, writings and impact of Andrew Carnegie (1835-
1919), the progenitor of modern-day entrepreneurial philanthropy, how these individuals 
secure substantial personal returns from their philanthropic investments (Ostrower, 1995; 
2002). We argue that philanthropic activities serve to boost the cultural, social and symbolic 
capital of entrepreneurs and increase their effectiveness as multi-positional agents within the 
field of power, the integrative domain that brings together elite actors from different walks of 
life, including business, politics, public administration, media and the law (Bourdieu, 1996; 
Maclean et al., 2010; Moore, 1979; Useem, 1979). It is through coalitions, alliances and 
networks forged within the field of power that entrepreneurs are able to influence societal 
decision-making processes, resource flows, institutional changes, and public opinion (Burt, 
2000; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Zald and Lounsbury, 2010). In assuming 
prominence at the pinnacle of society, legitimized and accepted in part through their status as 
philanthropists, leading entrepreneurs greatly increase their capacity to deliver desired 
outcomes within the realms of business and philanthropy (Marinetto, 1999). 
 In taking Andrew Carnegie as our exemplar, we aim to look afresh at his career and 
the continuing importance of his ideas and example. Carnegie was by no means the first 
wealthy industrialist to donate a large part of his fortune to philanthropic causes; but he was 
pioneering in his articulation of the ethics of entrepreneurial philanthropy and in putting 
theory into practice on a large scale (Curti, 1961; Wren, 1983): in terms of size of fortune, 
expressed in real terms, and the proportion of wealth disposed of charitably, Carnegie has few 
rivals (see Table 1). Invariably, the methods by which he came to accumulate his fortune and 
the reasons for its philanthropic disposal have been the subject of considerable academic 
interest. His rise from humble beginnings, the son of a Scottish handloom weaver who 
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migrated to the United States in 1848 when Andrew was aged 12, settling close to relatives in 
Allegheny City near Pittsburgh, to owner of a mighty steel company, sold to J.P. Morgan in 
1901 and reconstructed as US Steel, has been charted in detail (Hendrick, 1932; Wall, 1970; 
Livesay, 1975; Nasaw, 2006). There is likewise an extensive literature on his philanthropic 
activities from the early 1870s onwards (Lester, 1941; Van Slyck, 1995; Burlingame, 2004). 
What has not been done, however, is to consider how business and philanthropy were 
conjoined within his world. This we aim to do. 
 The article divides into four main sections. We first consider how entrepreneurship 
and philanthropy are related, and propose an original model of entrepreneurial philanthropy 
based on capital theory. The next section details Carnegie’s rise to power, his accumulation 
of a massive fortune, and his philanthropic projects, principles and practices. There then 
follows an analysis of the ways in which Carnegie accumulated and exploited non-standard 
forms of capital. We demonstrate how philanthropy repaid him in cultural, social and 
symbolic capital, strengthening his business and enabling him to engage in world making on 
an ever larger scale. In the final section, we draw together the threads of our argument, 
consider the implications for theory, reflect on the enduring importance of Carnegie’s 
philosophy and philanthropic practices, and assess the limitations of the study and 
potentialities for future research. 
 
Entrepreneurship and philanthropy 
We define entrepreneurial philanthropy as the pursuit by entrepreneurs on a not-for-profit 
basis of big social objectives through active investment of their economic, cultural, social 
and symbolic resources. The emphasis here is on the involvement and active identification of 
the entrepreneurial self in pursuit of opportunities for social betterment; the roles played by 
individuals varying by commitment and available resources, including those of mastermind, 
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investor, partner and champion (Acs and Phillips, 2002). As such, our definition of 
entrepreneurial philanthropy resonates with the various labels used in recent years to describe 
entrepreneurs who bring to philanthropy more than just money: venture philanthropy (Letts, 
Ryan and Grossman, 1997), strategic philanthropy (Sandfort, 2008), creative philanthropy 
(Anheier and Leat, 2006), enterprising philanthropy (Dees, 2008) and philanthrocapitalism 
(Bishop and Green, 2008). However, where we disagree with these sources is with respect to 
their emphasis on novelty; the idea that entrepreneurial philanthropy has emerged only in 
recent years in response to the challenges posed by globalization and persistent inequalities in 
incomes, health and economic opportunities. In our view, there exists a paradigm for 
entrepreneurial philanthropy that has been in continuous use since the late nineteenth century. 
We see few essential differences between the philanthropic practices of Andrew Carnegie and 
contemporaries like Bill Gates and Chris Cooper-Hohn (Bishop and Green, 2008: 1-87). In 
each case, there is recognition of the injustices stemming from structural inequalities, a desire 
for others to benefit from wealth creation, and active investment of economic, cultural, social 
and symbolic resources in ambitious schemes for social improvement. 
 A necessary but not sufficient condition for becoming an entrepreneurial 
philanthropist is to have amassed a fortune through one’s own endeavours. Typically, in the 
entrepreneurial life course, the largest fortunes are made by those entrepreneurs who become 
dominant actors within a defined economic field – Carnegie in steel, Rockefeller in oil, 
Hilton in hotels and Gates in computer software are illustrative – before extending their social 
reach and world-making ambitions. Dominant economic actors have abundant power, defined 
as command over resources (Maclean et al., 2006). They have risen to commanding positions 
within their industries typically through control of pivotal technologies or know-how, having 
a superior business model, and growth through large-scale mergers and acquisitions 
(Chandler, 1977: 415-500). By retaining control of their enterprises as they grow, they are 
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able to extract economic rents from broad swathes of the population. The acquisition of 
property rights, which grant license to extract economic rents, thus emerges as key to a 
generic understanding of how great personal fortunes are made (Keister, 2002: 55-106; 
Kuznets, 1955; Piketty and Saez, 2003). Acquiring a nexus of property rights sufficient to 
become a dominant actor within an economic field is not a passive process, but invariably 
requires victory in a succession of contests for control (Bourdieu, 1996; Jensen and Ruback, 
1983; O’Sullivan, 2000). Emerging victorious from such contests confers legitimacy and 
reinforces the right of dominant actors to harvest economic rents (Lado, Boyd and Hanlon, 
1997; Schoemaker, 1990; Tollison, 1982). Those who lose out in contests for control – for 
example, when their business is sold to a more dominant player – may also benefit as a 
proportion of future economic rents are pre-sold in order to secure the advantages of 
domination (DeTienne, 2010). Entrepreneurial philanthropists, therefore, may be members of 
the super-dominant business elite like Bill Gates, or an entrepreneur who has already cashed-
in, like his Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen. 
 In recognizing that power is fundamental to fortune making and philanthropy, and 
that the two are inextricably linked, we take a vital step towards understanding the true nature 
of entrepreneurial philanthropy, as a world-making process through which already successful 
entrepreneurs use their power to accumulate more power, extend their social and political 
influence, and increase their capacity to shape society according to their will. This definition 
– which describes an accumulative rather than a distributive process – runs counter to the 
view of entrepreneurs who become philanthropists as altruistic individuals who, having made 
a lot of money, are now ‘giving back’ to society to ‘make a difference’ (Duncan, 2004: 2159) 
to the lives of others less fortunate ‘as an expression of [their] sense of community with 
others’ (Boulding, 1962: 62). Rather, our thinking is more aligned with those who conceive 
large-scale philanthropy in terms of hyper-agency (Bishop and Green, 2008; Schervish, 2005) 
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and status distinctions within elite social groups (Ostrower, 1995). In our view, there are no 
clear motivational or temporal demarcations between the entrepreneurial and philanthropic 
lives of entrepreneurial philanthropists: the same individuals and the organizations they 
create are constantly changing and forever becoming (Chia, 2002; Tsoukas and Chia, 2002), 
and their dispositions are formed in specific contexts through everyday acts of practical 
coping and interactions with other actors (Clarke and Holt, 2010; Ucbasaran, Westhead and 
Wright, 2001). What distinguishes the most successful from the less successful is their 
capacity to learn, acceptance of changeability, and mastery of the on-going processes of 
industrial, organizational and personal transformation, which require them continuously to 
seize opportunities, fixing incrementally upon possibilities rather than what is now (Cope, 
2005; Harvey, 1979). 
The model presented in Figure 1, inspired by Bourdieu’s (1986b) work on forms of 
capital, is illustrative. In this, the entrepreneur is seen to possess four types of capital: 
economic, cultural, social and symbolic (Anheier, Gerhards and Romo, 1995; Harvey and 
Maclean, 2008; Terjesen and Elam, 2009). Economic capital consists of financial assets, non-
financial assets like patents, tangible assets in the form of facilities, plant and equipment, and 
the systems, processes and organizational routines that facilitate production, distribution and 
control. Cultural capital is shorthand for the personal dispositions, knowledge, know-how, 
skills and capabilities of the entrepreneur, business associates and key employees. Social 
capital exists in the form of connections, networks, relationships and alliances that deliver 
market intelligence and provide access to critical resources. Finally, symbolic capital, the 
signifiers that generate trust in partners, financiers, regulators, customers, suppliers and 
employees, works silently but powerfully to energise the business and create belief within 
markets (Harvey and Maclean, 2008; Maclean et al., 2006). The arrows at the centre of 
Figure 1 suggest two things. The first is transmutability: the conversion of one form of capital 
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into others (Bourdieu, 1986b). As priorities change, the free cash generated within a business 
from its stock of capital can be used incrementally for future investment (Dierickx and Cool, 
1989). The second is momentum. When free cash generation is positive, a business has the 
opportunity through reinvestment to enter into a self-reinforcing cycle of growth (Mueller, 
1986). When free cash generation is negative, the opposite situation prevails; the business 
withers and its asset structure decays. From this perspective, the most successful 
entrepreneurs are those with the capabilities needed to generate forward momentum and 
accumulate within their business significant economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital 
(Barringer et al., 2005; Finkelstein et al., 2007: 295-329), helping overcome the constraints to 
growth identified by Penrose (1959). 
[Insert Figure 1 Here] 
Entrepreneurs who ultimately emerge as dominant economic actors, leaders in their 
field, invariably have been on an entrepreneurial journey that has required them to embrace 
the necessity of deploying and accumulating each of the four forms of capital identified in 
Figure 1 (Finkelstein et al., 2007: 107-143). At the outset, having identified a winning 
product or service – a strong value proposition – and a business model through which this 
might be delivered, the challenge is to assemble the required economic, cultural, social and 
symbolic resources. It is not possible to devise a compelling value proposition without the 
market and technical knowledge that stems from cultural capital (Helfat and Lieberman, 
2002). Sufficient economic capital likewise is required to implement a sustainable business 
model (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2006). Without adequate social capital, the essential support of 
suppliers, partners and financiers will not be forthcoming (Baron and Markman, 2003). If 
there is no symbolic capital, it will be near impossible to gain access to networks or convince 
potential customers of the benefits of purchase (Zaheer et al., 1998). The entrepreneur must 
therefore deploy and leverage the capital he or she possesses to kick-start the business and 
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stimulate an upward spiral of capital accumulation. The deployment and rapid accumulation 
of social capital is crucial and dependent on the abilities and performance of the entrepreneur 
(Casson, 1994; Castanias and Helfat, 2001; Penrose, 1959). As momentum builds, fresh 
competitive challenges ensue: investment is required in infrastructure to capture economies 
of scale and scope; further knowledge and know-how must be acquired through investment in 
research and development or acquisition; additional social capital is needed to exploit market 
opportunities and navigate external environments; brand building and reputational 
enhancement likewise demand regular investment (Barney, 1997; Helfat, 1997; Petraf and 
Bergen, 2003; Teece et al., 1997). Throughout all of this, competitive pressures lead to 
regular contests for corporate control, restructuring and industrial concentration, 
simultaneously presenting new opportunities and challenges to develop capabilities and win 
competitive advantage (Anand et al., 2005; Barney, 1991; Capron and Pistre, 2002; Karim 
and Mitchell, 2000; Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). 
The journeys to the top taken by those entrepreneurs who emerge as dominant 
economic actors not only demand foresight and personal resilience, but also increasingly high 
levels of cultural, social and symbolic capital (Maclean et al., 2010). As companies become 
larger and more dominant, they also become more conspicuous and open to challenge from 
other powerful actors, such as politicians, regulators and consumer pressure groups 
(Domhoff, 1979). Dominant economic actors must exercise leadership on behalf of their 
industry as well as their own company. In doing so, they emerge as actors within the field of 
power in which the big questions of the day are settled through dialogue, negotiation and 
compromise between elite actors from different walks of life (Bourdieu, 1996; Domhoff, 
2002; Maclean et al., 2010; Useem, 1979). Within the field of power, dominant economic 
actors engage dialectically through conversations, speeches and other communications to 
shape opinions on matters of importance to their business (Smith, 2000); they operate 
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instrumentally to form associations, alliances and pressure groups to lobby decision makers 
for agreed outcomes (Baumgartner et al., 2009); and they function legislatively in consort 
with politicians, lawyers and officials to manage changes in the laws, regulations and 
established conventions that impact on their industry (Domhoff, 1979). In sum, entrepreneurs 
who rise to the top within their field, if they are to protect and enhance the position of their 
business, must learn to extend their reach beyond business to make common cause with other 
members of the elite (Clegg et al., 2006). 
From this perspective, the field of power is the point of union between business and 
philanthropy. To navigate within it, business leaders require considerable cultural, social and 
symbolic capital, and the most successful actively seek opportunities to renew and expand 
their capital base. This is done by a variety of means. Cultural capital is acquired by moving 
in the right circles to gather intelligence from those in the know. Orchestrating and 
participating in social gatherings, from dinner parties to invitations to premier cultural and 
sporting events, are favored for this purpose (Baron and Markman, 2003; Giddens, 1984). 
Social capital is acquired by extending network reach, and so business leaders often mutate 
into multi-positional actors by accepting invitations to join the boards of educational, 
governmental, cultural, sporting and philanthropic organizations (Burt, 2000; Geletkanycz 
and Hambrick, 1997; Ostrower, 2002). Here, by making common cause, they become 
familiar with other influential members of the social elite. Symbolic capital is acquired 
through recognition and respect. To stand out from the crowd, to be a distinguished figure – 
revered not reviled – it is necessary to transcend self interest and promote causes with 
apparent selflessness (Suchman, 1995). Championing causes that attract the support of the 
public, by giving voice and investing resources, is a source of distinction, often rewarded 
through State honours and honorary degrees (Bourdieu, 1986a; 1996). Together, possession 
of high levels of cultural, social and symbolic capital enables dominant economic actors to 
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increase their influence and power to determine the outcomes of societal events (Maclean, 
2008), Viewed in this light, they may be seen to deploy capital in its various forms to 
accumulate more power, in business and philanthropy. 
Our understanding of entrepreneurial philanthropy, viewed through the lens of capital 
theory, is modelled in Figure 2. This demonstrates that entrepreneurship (for-profit) and 
philanthropy (not-for-profit), far from being separate and distinctive activities, are related 
symbiotically one to another. Entrepreneurs invest economic capital in their philanthropic 
activities, most often through the vehicle of a charitable foundation, alongside their cultural, 
social and symbolic capital, which serve to increase the scale and effectiveness of their 
philanthropic activities, as the leverage achieved by Bill Gates through association with 
Warren Buffet illustrates (Bishop and Green, 2008: 1-5). The economic capital invested 
philanthropically by definition yields no direct return to the entrepreneur. However, 
potentially there are returns in the form of cultural, social and symbolic capital, which in turn 
might yield an economic return. Philanthropy thus construed serves as a vehicle for capital 
conversion, answering the question raised most succinctly by Boulding (1962, 60): what is 
‘the motivation for genuinely unilateral transfers, that is, a quid for which there is no quo’? 
The answer, we propose, in contradistinction to Boulding’s argument that philanthropy 
represents a ‘pure gift’ motivated by altruism, is that successful entrepreneurs are drawn to 
philanthropy as an unimpeachable source of the cultural, social and symbolic capital needed 
to navigate effectively in the field of power. They seek out influential social circles in which 
charitable giving and sitting on the boards of philanthropic foundations is an expectation, and 
the wealthier you are the more you are expected to contribute (Ostrawer, 1995; 2002). Not all 
entrepreneurs see the need to respond enthusiastically to the call; but for others, for whom 
further accretions of conventional wealth are of near-zero marginal utility, there is a powerful 
attraction to engaging in world making on a grand scale. The returns in cultural, social and 
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symbolic capital alone might justify such actions, but indirectly and somewhat paradoxically 
philanthropy might also serve to boost the entrepreneur’s financial fortunes. We next turn to 
put flesh on the theoretical bones through analysis of the career of Andrew Carnegie. 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
Carnegie, entrepreneurship and philanthropy 
There is a wealth of sources, primary (his autobiography, books, articles, speeches and 
business and personal papers) and secondary (biographies and thematic studies), on the life 
and career of Andrew Carnegie. In what follows, we resist the tendency common in the 
literature to judge Carnegie or question his integrity. This is not our purpose. In our view, his 
actions and achievements are best understood in relation to his lifelong quest to be somebody 
in the world, to make a big difference, and to be known for having made a big difference. 
Carnegie, we assert, was both the author and ‘hero’ of his own unfolding story (Gabriel, 
1995), forever looking ahead to the next chapter; actively seeking opportunity to engage in 
the business of world making. 
  There are few tales of rags-to-riches to rival that of Carnegie. He began his working 
life began as bobbin boy in a cotton mill in Allegheny City in 1848 aged 13 before joining the 
Atlantic & Ohio Telegraph Company as a messenger boy. It was here that he first made his 
mark, ingratiating himself with local businessmen and learning to decode telegraph messages 
by ear (Carnegie, 2006a: 33-60). His social skills and technical prowess brought him to the 
attention of Tom Scott, superintendent of the western division of the Pennsylvania Railroad, 
and in 1852 he was appointed Scott’s personal clerk and telegraph operator (Laird, 2006: 18-
22). He was an employee of one the nation’s largest, most profitable and rapidly growing 
enterprises, and stood out by virtue of his diligence and willingness to assume responsibility 
for operational decisions. He became trusted by the Pennsylvania’s senior executives, 
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including company president J. Edgar Thomson, enjoyed regular increases in salary, and was 
cut in as junior partner on insider money-making deals. In 1859, he was promoted to 
superintendent of the western division of the railroad based in Pittsburgh (Carnegie, 2006a: 
61-102; Nasaw, 2006: 54-65). As his range of business contacts multiplied, so too did his 
commitment to business venturing outside the company in oil, bridge building and iron 
manufacture. He resigned from the railroad in 1865 to pursue fresh opportunities as investor 
and company promoter, focusing on railroads, bridges and related industries (Carnegie, 
2006a: 103-132). He made money by drawing up prospectuses and selling stocks and bonds 
in US ventures mainly in New York, his operational base from 1868, and London (Carnegie, 
2006a: 133-157; Nasaw, 2006: 66-136; Wall, 1970: 212-231).  His success provided the 
wherewithal to enter the steel rail business, exploiting the potential for large-scale, low-cost 
production promised by the invention of the Bessemer converter (Livesay, 2006; Misa, 
1995). He and his partners invested heavily in a state-of-the-art works at Braddock near 
Pittsburgh, which they named after Edgar Thomson. The new enterprise flourished from the 
outset, with Carnegie as senior partner assuming the roles of strategist, decision taker, 
figurehead, contract chaser and negotiator, while his junior partners based in Pittsburgh had 
operational responsibility for the procurement, technical, manufacturing, commercial and 
financial aspects of the business (Carnegie, 2006a: 158-171; Nasaw, 2006: 137-183). A 
combination of relentless organic growth, which secured economies of scale and drove down 
costs, and major acquisitions – Frick Coke in 1881, the Homestead steel works in 1883, the 
Duquesne steel works in 1890, Oliver iron mining in 1894, and the Rockefeller Mesabi iron 
leases in 1896 – which achieved economies of scope, had raised the company to a position of 
industrial dominance by the time it was sold to J.P. Morgan in 1901 for $480 million 
(Chandler, 1977; Livesay, 2006; Misa, 1995). 
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 At the epicentre of an upward spiral of business growth for over four decades, 
Andrew Carnegie enjoyed virtually unbroken year-on-year increases in income and wealth. 
Already, by 1865, the year he left the Pennsylvania railroad, where his annual salary was 
$2,400, his income for the year was declared as $38,750. By 1868, he was earning $50,000 a 
year and had a net worth of $400,000 (Nasaw, 2006: 105-114). His strategy, in pursuit of a 
great fortune, was to invest his free cash in the Pittsburgh-based cluster of businesses he 
controlled rather than diversifying his holdings. In maintaining control, he could insist that 
the bulk of profits were reinvested to increase capacity and reduce unit costs (Livesay, 1977: 
420-425; Nasaw, 2006: 511-523; Tedlow, 2003: 52-59). His net worth was computed at 
$14.80 million in 1890; probably an underestimate, as typically the book value of his firms 
was stated well below their market value (Wall, 1970: 320-330). This was confirmed on the 
sale of Carnegie Steel when his share brought in $225.64 million in gold bonds yielding 5% 
per annum (Nasaw, 2006: 567-592). This sum was the economic resource underpinning 
Carnegie’s great period (1901-14) as entrepreneurial philanthropist and would-be world 
maker. 
 His philanthropic journey, outlined in Table 1, had begun decades before. In 1868, 
aged 33, he reflected that to ‘continue much longer overwhelmed by business cares and with 
most of my thoughts wholly upon the way to make more money in the shortest time, must 
degrade me beyond hope of permanent recovery’ (Nasaw, 2006: 113-114). Making his mark 
in the world, even at this embryonic stage, was for Carnegie about more than making money. 
A few years later, after entering the steel industry, he committed to philanthropy in earnest. 
The church organ he presented to his former church in Allegheny in 1873 and the endowment 
of swimming baths to his native town Dunfermline in 1874 were portents of things to come. 
In paying for thousands of church organs, he was not inspired by Christian faith, but by his 
belief in the civilizing power of music (Carnegie, 2006a: 240-241). Likewise, the public 
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libraries he donated to communities across the United States, Britain and British Empire, 
beginning in Dunfermline in 1879, bore testimony to his conviction that libraries, in 
promoting learning, could help others, however poor, to raise themselves up in the world 
(Carnegie, 2006a: 44-51; 2006b: 20-22). His ideas may not have been new; but through the 
organ and library programs, he raised the philanthropic bar by implementing systematic, 
criteria-based grant-making on an unprecedented scale (Nasaw, 2006: 605-609). The model, 
refined progressively on the basis of experience, was to guide applicants through a process 
that ensured projects were properly scaled – organs to buildings and libraries to communities 
– and sustainable. In the case of libraries, sustainability was assured not by making 
endowments but by having local authorities accept responsibility for book stocks and running 
costs as a condition of grant (Van Slyk, 1995). As his philanthropic endeavours expanded, 
Carnegie avoided run-ins with business partners or investors in his companies because he 
used entirely his own money. Whilst there are numerous cases in the course of the twentieth 
century of shareholders taking legal action against directors over their philanthropic 
contributions (Banerjee, 2007), this was not something Carnegie had to contend with. To use 
his companies’ funds would have been to fail to reap the profit of disinterestedness which is 
only fully captured when actions appear ‘on the hither side of calculation and in the illusion 
of the most “authentic” sincerity’ (Bourdieu, 1977: 214). 
 As the ownership structure of modern capitalism was transformed, so too were the 
philanthropic priorities of business leaders. In this regard, Carnegie was a pioneer. His 
thoughts on enterprise and philanthropy, refined over the 1870s and 1880s through 
experience of both worlds, were brought together in 1889 in his two-part essay ‘Wealth’ 
published in the North American Review, and re-printed many times since as The Gospel of 
Wealth (Carnegie, 2006b: 1-30). In his view, the staggering inequalities of wealth of the 
industrial age were explained as a consequence of human progress. Competition between 
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producers had led them to employ ever more productive technologies on an ever larger scale, 
resulting in the concentration of production in the hands of the most competent entrepreneurs. 
In the process, the population benefited from cheaper goods and rising living standards; but a 
small number of individuals with a rare talent for organizing had grown supremely rich 
(Carnegie, 2006b:63). This was bad not because the entrepreneurial class was undeserving of 
reward, but because the scale of reward was excessive, productive of envy, and threatening to 
the social compact between rich and poor, capital and labor. Successful entrepreneurs, he 
reasoned, had the solution at hand: they should administer their wealth responsibly for public 
benefit (Carnegie, 2006b: 65-67). Leaving fortunes to family members was debilitating as it 
sapped the moral fibre of beneficiaries; while simply leaving bequests in support of good 
causes was passive and potentially wasteful. What was needed was the active management of 
wealth by those most capable of investing wisely on behalf of the community, during their 
own lifetime. In Carnegie’s words (2006b: 10): 
 
This, then, is held to be the duty of the man of Wealth: To set an example of modest, 
unostentatious living, shunning display or extravagance; to provide moderately for 
the legitimate wants of those dependent upon him; and, after doing so, to consider 
all surplus revenues which come to him simply as trust funds, which he is called 
upon to administer in the manner which, in his judgement, is best calculated to 
produce the most beneficial results for the community – the man of wealth thus 
becoming the mere trustee and agent for his poorer brethren, bringing to their 
service his superior wisdom, experience, and ability to administer, doing for them 
better than they would or could for themselves. 
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By thinking big and providing communities with universities, libraries, hospitals, parks, 
cultural, recreational and sporting facilities, entrepreneurs might forsake almsgiving and 
focus instead on creating opportunities for ‘those who will help themselves’ by providing ‘the 
ladders upon which the aspiring can rise’ (Carnegie, 2006b: 11). Individualism might thus be 
preserved, and the perils of socialism and anarchism avoided. Entrepreneurial philanthropy 
was thus positioned as the best means of preserving a free, democratic society. Hence his 
famous dictum: ‘The man who dies thus rich dies disgraced’ (Carnegie, 2006b: 12). 
  In matters philanthropic, Carnegie lived by his word. Five things stand out with 
respect to his practice. First, and most obviously, Carnegie thought big and embraced world 
making on a grand scale (see Table 1); distributing the vast majority of his fortune 
philanthropically in his own lifetime. The cluster of museums he created in Pittsburgh in the 
1890s, for example, forms a cultural hub of edificial proportion (Couvares, 1984). Second, he 
invested more than money in his projects; he applied his cultural, social and symbolic capital 
to bring projects to life and expand horizons. His contribution to the international peace 
movement involved writing, public speaking, organizing high-profile events, pressing for 
legislative changes and international agreements, and seeking the support of governments and 
heads of state (Dubin, 1979). Third, he was discerning and principled in his selection of 
philanthropic opportunities. Large numbers of unsolicited propositions were rejected; for 
example, he repeatedly refused funding requests from top universities and colleges, 
preferring instead to invest in schools for working-class children, black and white, such as 
Booker T. Washington’s pioneering Tuskegee College and Carnegie Mellon University, 
originally the Carnegie Institute of Technology (Nasaw, 2006: 599-601). Fourth, Carnegie 
was not afraid to innovate, as the Hero Funds established in the United States and Europe to 
recognize the self-sacrificial deeds of ordinary citizens exemplify. His scheme to provide 
pensions for university and college teachers changed the face of higher education in the 
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United States by raising standards, as only those satisfying strict criteria could join, and by 
creating the platform for a national higher education superannuation scheme (Wall, 1970: 
826-834). Fifth, Carnegie consciously set out to make a difference in the long run by setting 
up his trusts and foundations on a sustainable basis. To achieve this – as with the Carnegie 
Corporation of New York – he resisted specifying mission and purpose in detail, preferring 
instead to issue guidelines and then allow the trustees to shape policy flexibly according to 
the dictates of the time (Wall, 1970: 883-884). 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
Carnegie, capital accumulation and the field of power 
The picture of Carnegie emerging from our analysis is of a committed entrepreneurial 
philanthropist, an orchestrator and hyper-agent motivated by a passion for world making. His 
words and deeds cannot be explained by altruism, which does not sit easily with his egoism 
and love of power. What stands out more strongly is that philanthropy repaid him 
handsomely in terms of cultural, social and symbolic capital, increasing, not diminishing, his 
overall capital stock, and securing for him a position of influence as a multi-positional actor 
within the field of power (Bourdieu, 1996). We elaborate this thesis below, proposing that 
philanthropy should be viewed as part of his career-long drive to accumulate and exploit non-
standard forms of capital as a means of fortune building and world making (see Table 2). 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Accumulating cultural capital 
Cultural capital may be assimilated without conscious effort through everyday interactions 
with people and things within micro-environments; what Bourdieu (1990) calls habitus, the 
invisible but powerful structuring structure that is formative of dispositions, preferences, 
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tastes and personal style (Anheier et al., 1995). Families especially imprint themselves, and it 
is through families that cultural differentiation between social classes and class fractions is 
perpetuated. Individuals emanating from the upper reaches of society, Bourdieu observes 
(1991; 1996), come ready equipped with a social compass, enabling them to act appropriately 
in a wide range of social situations. Their counterparts from less privileged backgrounds, by 
contrast, if they are to be competitive, must compensate by acquiring cultural capital more 
consciously through emulation, conversation, formal instruction, reading, research and 
experimentation. In the case of Andrew Carnegie, he acquired through habitus, as a member 
of a politically radical family, the disposition to challenge the prevailing social order, 
campaign for change, and advocate social improvement (Carnegie, 2006a:7-32). His family 
may have been materially poor, but in terms of cultural capital his inheritance was not 
negligible. He was instilled with a fierce desire to learn, to have and apply knowledge, and, 
while he may have had just a few years at school in Dunfermline, he was an accomplished 
autodidact (Nasaw, 2006: 44-45, 60-61 and 90-92). 
Carnegie’s writings on travel (1890, 1933), the United States (2005), industrial 
relations (Wall, 1992), business and philanthropy (Carnegie, 2006b), and his own life 
(2006a), confirm by their fluency, detailed observations, stories and robust argumentation 
that he was a knowledgeable thinker with a talent for expressing himself succinctly. Far from 
devoting all of his time to ‘money grubbing’, he made time throughout his career for reading 
and cultural pursuits (Nasaw, 2006: 185-87). As a young man, he gained access to Colonel 
Anderson’s library in Allegheny City, which fuelled a lifelong passion for the study of 
history, politics, current affairs, literature and philosophy; writing in his autobiography that 
he would not exchange his ‘taste for literature ... for all the millions that were ever amassed 
by man’ (Carnegie, 2006a: 45). As his career blossomed, he spent long periods travelling and 
observing other cultures and economic systems. His first long vacation in 1862 took him back 
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to Scotland and then onto London, where he visited the Art and Invention exhibition at the 
Crystal Palace (Carnegie, 2006a: 99-102). In 1865, he made his first grand tour of Europe 
absorbing himself in art and music (Carnegie, 2006a: 127-128). A succession of tours and 
coaching holidays followed, traversing Britain, continental Europe, the Middle East and Asia, 
which gave him a deeper appreciation and sensitivity towards culture, politics and business 
(Carnegie, 1890; 1933). His learning enabled him to move freely in New York cultural and 
political circles, being elected to the Nineteenth Century Club in 1883 where he debated with 
university presidents and other public intellectuals (Nasaw, 2006: 207-220). Earlier, when 
still resident in Pittsburgh, he had already begun to acquire through emulation the manners, 
dress sense, tastes and sensibilities of an upper-class gentleman, affectionately describing in 
his autobiography how Miss Wilkins, the daughter of Judge Wilkins, head of ‘the leading 
family of Western Pennsylvania’, took him in hand and furnished him ‘with another means of 
self improvement’, teaching him how to relax and enjoy ‘musical parties, charades, and 
theatricals’ (Carnegie, 1920: 86-7). His later success as society host at his homes in New 
York and Scotland, where he entertained prominent writers, musicians, academics, 
politicians, lawyers, industrialists, financiers, and even the British monarch (Edward VII), 
owed much to these lessons in charm, etiquette and storytelling (Nasaw, 2006: 303-306). 
In the late 1870s and early 1880s, Carnegie’s library program attracted widespread 
attention, bringing him into contact with politicians and opinion formers on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In Britain, he identified with the Liberal Party intelligentsia, forming an enduring 
friendship with John Morley, editor of the Fortnightly Review (1867-82) and later Secretary 
of State for India (1905-11), and meeting and corresponding regularly with William 
Gladstone, Prime Minister for four terms between 1868 and 1894 (Carnegie, 2006a: 266-
285). Inclusion in such circles opened up new vistas for Carnegie and brought him directly 
into contact with Herbert Spencer, the guru of social Darwinism, whose ideas he assimilated 
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(Carnegie, 2006a: 286-292). He adopted Spencer’s evolutionary view of society as advancing 
through competition and the survival of the fittest; there might be casualties along the way, 
but government should resist intervening and let natural processes dictate outcomes 
(Wiltshire, 1978). This was the philosophical foundation for Carnegie’s writings on a variety 
of topics, including his pronouncements on how to succeed in business, organized labor and 
the virtues of republicanism (Nasaw, 2006: 221-232). In his world, philanthropy and the 
accumulation of cultural capital had merged seamlessly one into the other. 
 
Accumulating social capital 
Social capital exists when an actor within a network of social relations is willing to grant 
another actor access to scarce resources under his or her control (Adler and Kwon, 2002). 
The resources sought by an actor may be tangible or intangible, and include money, 
information, introductions, opportunities and endorsements. Reciprocity is implied, but it is 
not a necessary condition for the existence of social capital; and while social relations may be 
stable and enduring, the willingness of one actor to favour another can never be guaranteed 
(Burt, 1997). The value of social capital is thus contingent; the fortunes of an actor rising or 
falling by current personal standing and network strength. Multi-positional actors like 
Carnegie pursue a strategy of accumulating social capital within several social networks to 
widen the pool of resources available to them and reduce exposure to network failure (Burt, 
2000; Maclean, 2008). To accumulate social capital within any network, an actor must satisfy 
the tacitly understood obligations of membership. Much depends on the capacity of the actor 
to win favor, which requires the acquisition and application of relational skills (Baron and 
Markman, 2003). Likewise, when breaking into or forming a new network, an actor cannot 
progress without instilling belief and confidence in others (De Carolis et al., 2009). 
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  Laird (2006) has demonstrated that social capital formation has been integral to the 
economic expansion of the Unites States from its inception. Her research pours cold water on 
the myth of self-made men who, like Carnegie, are seen to triumph purely by dint of their 
own personal resourcefulness. In Carnegie’s case, he is shown to have benefited in the early 
days from family connections and rootedness in the Scottish immigrant community, which 
secured opportunities ahead of others. Once employed in the office of Tom Scott, he 
benefitted from having a mentor who was himself a rising star with a network of social 
relations extending beyond the Pennsylvania Railroad. It was here that Carnegie learned to 
exploit his charm and privileged position as Scott’s confidante to refine his relational skills 
and gain entry to powerful business networks (Laird, 2006: 25-31). He emerged as a master 
of ingratiation; lionizing his friends and associates in letters and conversations while making 
plain what he expected of them. He was equally solicitous of business partners like Henry 
Frick, industry leaders like Edgar Thomson, financiers like Junius Morgan, intellectuals like 
Herbert Spencer, politicians like Theodore Roosevelt, and Heads of State like the German 
Kaiser. In all cases, he applied the same recipe of flattery and high expectation (Nasaw, 
2006). This technique, allied to a presumptuous, proactive approach to forging new contacts 
and keeping others warm, made him a formidable networker. His proclivity for gift giving 
and entertaining helped him hold together three distinct networks, each serving as a resource 
to further his business and world-making ambitions (Wall, 1970). His inner circle consisted 
of the family members and business partners who took daily care of his business interests in 
Pittsburgh. Beyond this was the circle of business leaders at the pinnacle of US industry. His 
wider circle consisted of a diversity of actors within the fields of power in the United States 
and Britain, and included financial magnates, top politicians, media moguls, cultural leaders 
and public intellectuals (Carnegie, 2006a: 172-177, 256-320). 
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 Carnegie’s emergence as a powerful actor within the field of power, replete with 
social capital, owed much to his philanthropy. After 1880, when his gifts of libraries to 
Dunfermline and Braddock became common knowledge, his various philanthropic 
endeavours were widely acclaimed (Nasaw, 2006: 207). The doors of high society and the 
corridors of political power were now open to him. He became famous during the 1880s as a 
writer and public intellectual through a series of articles in newspapers and magazines that 
engaged with topical issues of the day, notably tariffs, big business and the formation of 
trusts, and trade unions (Wall, 1992). His philanthropic activities lent him distinction as an 
individual who prized community and the welfare of others, enabling him to speak with 
seeming objectivity, appreciating all sides of a question; no more so than with respect to the 
labor unrest then rumbling across America. In 1886, he published in Forum magazine ‘An 
Employer’s View of the Labor Question’ and ‘Results of the Labor Struggle’, in which he 
emphasized the common interests of capital and labor (Wall, 1992). The solution to wage 
disputes was not to ban unions but the adoption of sliding scales for wages, rising and falling 
in line with the prices of finished products. If strikes did occur, employers should be patient 
and close their premises rather than employing strike breakers because ‘there is an unwritten 
law amongst the best workmen: thou shalt not take thy neighbour’s job’ (Wall, 1992: 102-3). 
Remarkably, for a time, before the bitter strike at his Homestead works in 1892, Carnegie 
commanded the respect of both the labor movement and the political establishment. He began 
to move in high circles within the Republican Party, holidaying in Britain with presidential 
candidate James Blaine, and becoming acquainted with a succession of Presidents, including 
Benjamin Harrison, William McKinley and Theodore Roosevelt (Carnegie, 2006a: 293-314; 
Nasaw, 2006: 327-324, 511-523). His position was consolidated by the publication of the 
Gospel of Wealth, showing how inequalities in the distribution of wealth might through 
philanthropy be turned to advantage (Carnegie, 2006b), and by systematically drawing in 
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leading members of the elite like John Hay and Elihu Root as board members for his trusts 
and foundations (Nasaw, 2006: 593-682). 
 
Accumulating symbolic capital 
 In any field of human endeavour, individuals who win the right to rule are those possessing 
the highest levels of symbolic capital, the formal and informal signifiers of legitimacy and 
distinction that mark out actors active within the field of power (Bourdieu, 1986a; 1986b; 
1996). Formal signifiers include educational qualifications, prized memberships, elevated job 
titles, and honours conferred by universities and governments. Informal signifiers, potentially 
more powerful but harder won, include public recognition, celebrity, identification with 
virtue, and lionization (Maclean et al., 2006: 23-49). Those with the right amount and blend 
of symbolic capital are by popular consent deemed fit to hold high office. They are trusted, 
their ideas respected, and their leadership accepted. They may not be universally liked or 
approved of, but they are perceived as credible and engender belief. The most successful 
actors recognize the importance of symbolic capital accumulation early in their careers. They 
gain qualifications and seek promotions and practical experience. They engage in image 
building and recognize the value of personal myth-making; stories which, though loosely 
grounded in fact, reveal to the world a desirable quality or capability. Recognition and 
reputation are further enhanced through symbolic association as supporters of powerful actors 
already active in the field of power. Inclusion on the periphery of elevated circles provides 
further opportunities to shine by gaining prized memberships and establishing voice through 
speaking, writing and the exercise of leadership. On moving from peripheral to central 
positions within the field of power their ideas gain intellectual currency, and they begin to 
collect the honours that speak of distinction. 
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 The relentless rise in power and influence of Andrew Carnegie from the 1850s to the 
1910s was both a consequence and cause of his capacity to accumulate symbolic capital. 
There are five constants revealed over seven decades. First, Carnegie was a master of 
symbolic association. He identified himself as supporter, friend and associate with many 
leading businessmen, intellectuals and politicians of his age, cherishing the role early in his 
career as ‘Scott’s Andy’ just as later he was happy to be known as a disciple of Herbert 
Spencer (Carnegie, 2006a: 68, 291). The patriotism evident in his writing, especially his 
bestseller Triumphant Democracy (1886), likewise positions him as a champion of the 
establishment, however seemingly radical his language and proposals. Second, he insisted on 
being heard, on putting forth his arguments. As a teenager he used his rhetorical skills to 
campaign for access to Colonel Anderson’s library, and thereafter he spent a large part of his 
time communicating through books, journal contributions, newspaper articles, letters to 
opinion formers, and public speeches, delivered in a direct, persuasive style. He considered 
his influence to grow ‘more than anything else’ from this ability (Nasaw, 2006: 187). 
Carnegie, in short, knew how to use ‘propaganda’ to further his cause. Third, he was expert in 
propagating myths that marked him out ahead of his rivals. In his autobiography, he describes 
how in a crisis situation he audaciously took over the scheduling of trains on the 
Pennsylvania railroad without authority, signing orders in the name of Scott. All worked out 
well and the legend of the talented ‘little Scots devil’ was born, communicated upward by his 
amused boss (Carnegie, 2006a: 66-67). Later, as we have seen, he propagated the myth of 
Carnegie, champion of the working man (Carnegie, 206: 208-220; Wall, 1992), and Carnegie 
supreme dealmaker, one of few to get the better of J.D. Rockefeller (Chernow, 1998: 366-
368). Fourth, he was never afraid to inflict symbolic violence (Bourdieu, 1990) to assert his 
independence and authority. As Tedlow observes, his eventual break with Scott following his 
withdrawal of support for the Texas and Pacific Railroad, was as much a public statement of 
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independence as it was a rational business decision (Tedlow, 2003). More generally, the 
alacrity with which he censured or sacked senior managers, even partners, who deviated from 
policy or instruction attests to his readiness to use fear as an instrument of control (Nasaw, 
2006: 567-572). Fifth, Carnegie understood the power of the press and went to great lengths 
to cultivate good relations; providing stories, offering comments on unfolding events, and 
making headlines with controversial proposals, as in 1908 when he caused a sensation by 
advocating removal of the protective tariff on imported steel (Nasaw, 2006: 702-704). 
 Philanthropy was Carnegie’s trump card in his campaign to accumulate symbolic 
capital. In terms of symbolic association, the scale of his giving set him apart and gave him 
access to elite actors denied to others. Few entrepreneurs have enjoyed the opportunity to 
lecture elevated political leaders on pressing topics – for example, Gladstone on political 
organization, McKinley on imperialism, and Roosevelt on international peace – as Carnegie 
did (Carnegie, 2006a: 274-314). Fewer still have had public tributes paid to them like 
Gladstone’s review and recommendation of The Gospel of Wealth (1890) in Nineteenth 
Century. In terms of voice, the appeal of his writings on philanthropy made him the public 
face and spokesperson for the wealthy of America, establishing a creed and setting an 
example that others like Rockefeller later followed (Chernow, 1998: 313-314). In terms of 
myth-making, his pledge to distribute almost all his fortune in his own lifetime gave him the 
ultimate distinction of originality; all followers being, to use Bishop and Green’s phrase 
(2008), ‘Carnegie’s children.’ In terms of symbolic violence, his readiness to say no to the 
countless appeals for charitable donations received on a daily basis, like Gladstone’s request 
for funds for the Bodleian library (Nasaw, 2006: 538), proclaimed his independence and 
spoke of his integrity. Finally, in terms of media manipulation, philanthropy provided a stage 
for public pronouncements, which he used to great effect in the aftermath of Homestead to 
restore his reputation; the speech he delivered in 1895 at the opening of his cultural complex 
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in Pittsburgh made headline news, Congressman Dalzell eulogizing that ‘there are 
unnumbered hearts here and elsewhere ... that beat to the measure of God Bless Andrew 
Carnegie, and hearts shall continue thus to beat through generations yet unborn’ (Nasaw, 
2006: 503). 
 
Business, philanthropy and the field of power 
Elite actors within the field of power strive for enforceable agreement on matters of policy, 
law and resourcing within specific jurisdictions. Agreements assume legitimacy when public 
and elite opinion are aligned. When they are not, the potential exists for civil unrest (Smith, 
2000). The stakes are high and contests between different coalitions within the elite over 
policies, laws and resources are common (Bourdieu, 1996; Maclean, 2008). Politicians, given 
their on-going need for electoral approval, are especially sensitive to public opinion, and the 
coalitions they join must strive for approbation (Domhoff, 1979). Thus the elite, while 
collectively dominant, is not immutable. The contests that take place require actors from 
different backgrounds to make common cause on an issue-by-issue basis (Clegg, Courpasson 
and Philips, 2006). It would be mistaken to think of the field of power as a set of factions or 
hard-wired networks. There may be established cliques, but this does not imply permanence, 
as fluidity is necessary for stability within power-laden social processes (Baumgartner et al., 
2009). The most dominant actors have the resources needed to form and lead issue-based 
coalitions (Zald and Lounsbury, 2010). They have ready access to the elite meeting places 
where members debate issues and form coalitions, and have the resources needed to launch 
and sustain lengthy campaigns for public support and government action (Giddens, 1984).  
Andrew Carnegie, in possession of extensive cultural, social and symbolic capital, had 
the power and authority needed to serve as ‘play-maker’ in the business of world making. As 
entrepreneur, Carnegie’s greatest achievement was to mastermind the growth of his steel 
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company from industry minnow to industrial mastery. On the ground, this required relentless 
pursuit of cost savings, quality improvements and increased production through the 
reinvestment of profits in superior plant and equipment (Livesay, 1977; Misa, 1995). Equally, 
it required Carnegie, from his base in New York, to assume a leading role in managing in the 
industrial landscape. His writings on industrial relations, trusts, and tariffs were interventions 
in a series of related but distinct contests to influence public opinion during the 1880s and 
1890s (Hendrick, 1933; Wall, 1992). The unifying theme of the opposition to big business 
supported by the Democratic Party was that monopolistic practices and tariffs on foreign 
imports had kept prices high to the detriment of consumers, lining the pockets of Robber 
Baron industrialists like Carnegie (Nasaw, 2006: 481-484). It was true that the steel industry 
had been sheltered from competition, and that the most efficient firms had earned super-
normal profits in consequence (Misa, 1995), but Carnegie countered that tariffs had enabled 
the industry to establish itself with enormous benefits for employment and economic 
development (Hendrick, 1933: I-306-350). This was the pro-tariffs line taken by the 
Republican Party and its steel industry supporters, who lobbied fiercely against radical 
revision of existing schedules. Carnegie, a Republican supporter but also intensely pragmatic 
and aware of public opinion, spent a good deal of time in Washington promoting the view 
that as the steel industry grew in strength modest revisions to tariffs might be desirable; an 
argument that prevailed following the bitter election of 1888 which saw Republican 
Benjamin Harrison elected President, and continued to hold sway even after Democrat 
Grover Cleveland was returned to office in 1892 (Nasaw, 2006: 375-377). Carnegie rode the 
political waves, setting the tone through his writings, speeches and newspaper comments, and 
cultivating personal relations with Washington powerbrokers like Blaine, who served as 
Secretary of State under Harrison, Benjamin Tracy, Navy Secretary, and Commander Folger, 
adviser to Tracy, who holidayed with Carnegie in Scotland. It is through this network that 
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Carnegie won lucrative government contracts for the supply of nickel-steel battle armour 
(Nasaw, 2006: 3378-384). In this and in many other ways – buying land at favourable prices, 
avoiding competition, breaking strikes and negotiating takeover deals, for example – he 
benefited financially from his centrality as a capital-rich actor within the field of power. 
 As philanthropist, Carnegie sought to extend his world-making reach beyond business 
to encompass society-at-large. This was a natural development. From his earliest days at the 
Pennsylvania Railroad he had worked with men like Scott and Thomson who in business 
looked beyond the now, to the future, to imagine a nation changed in part through their own 
endeavours. From them Carnegie assimilated the same transformational cast of mind, which 
became more pronounced as success followed success. As his familiarity with the workings 
of the field of power increased, and as the capital at his disposal grew ever larger, he found 
other powerful actors willing to join forces with him to realize seemingly audacious goals. 
The satisfactions were immense, and he never tired of the acclaim that came with world 
making; collecting awards and tributes across the United States, Britain and continental 
Europe (Wall, 1970: 870-898). Regular triumphs and immense resources made Carnegie bold 
to the point that he was willing to invest heavily in the cause of international peace and 
arbitration. In this, the great cause of his retirement years, he drew heavily on his social and 
symbolic capital in attempting to position the United States as champion of arbitration in 
resolving international disputes (Carnegie, 2006: 243-246; Nasaw, 2006: 649). He had 
unrivalled access to President Roosevelt and his Secretaries of State, John Hay and Elihu 
Root. On the other side of the Atlantic, after the Liberal Party came to government in 1905, 
he was on familiar terms with many Cabinet members, including Prime Minister Campbell-
Bannerman (Carnegie, 2006: 315-319; Nasaw, 2006: 678-682). In the build-up to The Hague 
peace conference in 1907, he was engaged in shuttle diplomacy, trying to align the positions 
of the United States and British governments, and as President of the National Arbitration 
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Conference he hosted a peace conference in New York with official representatives from 
each of the European Great Powers (Nasaw, 2006: 684-689). Little of real substance came of 
Carnegie’s efforts, but the seeds of future developments were sown, and The Hague Peace 
Palace, which he funded, remains a memorial to his commitment. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The main findings of this article, established theoretically and confirmed empirically, are 
fourfold. First, entrepreneurial philanthropy is animated by the world-making ambitions of 
entrepreneurs; individuals who having achieved big things within business now seek to 
extend their reach into the realm of the social as means of personal aggrandizement. 
Entrepreneurial philanthropists rarely abandon business in favour of philanthropy, often 
engaging in both contemporaneously, at least until the final stage of their careers. In their 
everyday routines and practices, business and philanthropy merge naturally. Second, 
entrepreneurial philanthropy is not a one-way street. Entrepreneurial philanthropists invest in 
the future and their investments yield returns directly in cultural, social and symbolic capital, 
which indirectly might yield significant economic returns. While some observers have 
suggested that the relationship between philanthropy and company profits is unclear 
(Ullmann, 1985), at the level of the individual entrepreneurial philanthropist, it is our view 
that philanthropy may serve as a mechanism for capital conversion and capital accumulation. 
In this we follow Suchman (1995: 585), who points out that in certain arenas a social 
conscience may prove ‘personally rewarding’. Third, entrepreneurs bring to philanthropy the 
mental models, strategies, tactics, routines and practices learned through creating and 
building a successful business. This explains the emphasis given to scale, efficiency, 
sustainability, focus, capabilities, governance and accountability. It also explains the 
awareness shown by entrepreneurial philanthropists of potential synergies and the 
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interrelatedness of people, processes and activities. Fourth, the standing and influence within 
the field of power of entrepreneurs who become philanthropists is greatly enhanced. The cash 
invested in philanthropy boosts their stocks of cultural, social and symbolic capital, enabling 
them more easily to form and lead issue-based coalitions, and to engage confidently in the 
dialectical, instrumental and legislative processes that win elite and public support for big 
projects, business and philanthropic. 
 We make a singular contribution to the entrepreneurship literature in the capital 
theoretic model of entrepreneurial philanthropy presented in Figure 2. Building upon 
Bourdieu’s typology of capital (Bourdieu, 1986b; Harvey and Maclean, 2008), this 
demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between entrepreneurship and philanthropy, and 
highlights the role of philanthropy in the processes of capital conversion and accumulation. 
Our empirical study confirms the importance of each of the four main forms of capital 
identified by Bourdieu, and the complex interplay that exists between them when deployed 
within the field of power by dominant actors like Carnegie. The implications are significant. 
The focus in much of the entrepreneurship and related literatures on non-standard forms of 
capital has been on the definition, measurement and exploitation of social capital, reflecting 
the long-standing interest of social scientists in network theory, and effectively relegating 
cultural and symbolic capital to lesser roles within the theoretical domain. Our study, by 
contrast, affirms the greater realism inherent in Bourdieu’s original approach, and suggests 
there is more to gain analytically by taking a unified rather than piecemeal approach to 
capital theory. Cultural and symbolic capital warrant serious study. In Carnegie’s case, for 
example, we have seen how his intellectual currency was partly the product of his intimacy 
with intellectuals like Spencer, Morley and Arnold, and in turn how this was an important 
source of legitimacy and personal distinction. We do not propose that the four forms of 
capital identified by Bourdieu are practically indivisible, but we do suggest that accumulation 
31 
 
and exploitation should be treated as interconnected processes involving all four types of 
capital. Our study further points to the importance of specific micro-practices to 
understanding the acquisition and development of capital accumulative entrepreneurial 
capabilities. Entrepreneurs like Carnegie, alive to opportunities, develop through habitus and 
experience a reflexive sense of how to react appropriately in the moment, joining things 
together in ways that others cannot see. They may make mistakes, but their tried-and-tested 
routines and familiar practices enable them to act with confidence to build momentum and 
acquire fresh cultural, social and symbolic capital. Critics of Carnegie have long held that it 
was not he but his partners, who worked harder and had greater technical knowledge, who 
made his fortune; while he spent much of his time at leisure in New York and Scotland 
(Nasaw, 2006: 643-645). What they have failed to see, of course, is that he understood the 
bigger picture, knew how to accumulate cultural, social and symbolic capital, and was at 
work even when seemingly at play. 
 Carnegie’s pervasive influence within the field of entrepreneurial philanthropy stems 
more than anything from his authorship of the Gospel of Wealth. The harvesting of economic 
rents on a massive scale by entrepreneurs who retain ownership of industry-dominant firms, 
and the associated consequences for the distribution of income and wealth, have long 
inflamed public opinion, periodically provoking sections within ruling elites to break ranks 
and attempt corrective action, through taxation or legislation to curb monopoly power. In 
these circumstances, the right to possess great wealth becomes a contested issue, painful for 
wealth holders ‘on trial’ in the court of public opinion or, worse, actually ending up in the 
dock. As so-called ‘Robber Barons’, Carnegie was branded a hypocrite; Rockefeller saw 
Standard Oil broken up; and Andrew Mellon, after serving as United States Treasury 
Secretary, was put on trial for tax evasion (Cannadine, 2008: 505-541). More recently, the 
pursuit of anti-trust cases against Microsoft in the United States (1998-2002) and Europe 
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(2003-2007) is a reminder of the power of governments, backed by public opinion, to 
sanction even the most dominant global corporations. Carnegie and Rockefeller in particular 
were stung by the Robber Baron critique and feared its consequences (Chernow, 1998: 487-
501; Nasaw, 2006: 346-351). The Gospel of Wealth, which Carnegie composed and 
Rockefeller embraced, offered a dignified solution. By voluntarily ‘giving back’ to 
communities, entrepreneurs might demonstrate that inequality was a temporary phenomenon 
which, through wise spending, could deliver public benefit. In exchange for their 
munificence, entrepreneurs turned philanthropists would gain the right to engage in world 
making on a grand scale. Carnegie’s tract, substantiated by his own example and that of 
Rockefeller, was embraced by the ruling elite and, with media approval, helped persuade the 
masses in the United States and beyond to tolerate on-going inequalities. The fact that many 
of today’s leading philanthropists – including Gates, Buffet and Feeney – attest to the impact 
of the Gospel on their own thinking and practices, regarding the book as ‘practically holy 
scripture’ (Bishop and Green, 2008: 13), confirms the continuing appeal of the logic of 
entrepreneurial philanthropy championed by Carnegie, confronted with the burdensome issue 
of what to do with more money than they could ever spend in a lifetime. This said, while the 
example of Andrew Carnegie has undeniably influenced other business elites to assume a 
philanthropic role, it is important not to exaggerate Carnegie’s influence in his own lifetime 
or subsequently. Ultimately, the logic of entrepreneurial philanthropy derives not from ethics 
but from the consequences of capitalism and globalization. Gates and Buffet, like Rockefeller 
and Mellon, are intellectually gifted, capable, when confronted by their own situation and 
attendant external pressures, of independently concluding that ‘the problem of our age is the 
proper administration of wealth, so that the ties of brotherhood may still bind together the 
rich and poor in harmonious relationship’ (Carnegie, 2006b: 1). Likewise, it is natural, with 
or without reading Carnegie, that they should apply business methods within philanthropy, 
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pursue capital accumulative strategies, lead issue-based coalitions, and seek public support 
for world-making projects (Clegg et al., 2006; Creed et al., 2002; Maclean et al., 2010; Zald 
and Lounsbury, 2010). 
 The theoretical ideas presented in this article cannot be tested fully through analysis 
of a single case, however rich or seminal. More extensive research on the quantitative 
dimensions of wealth creation and philanthropy is needed before we have the true measure of 
contemporary entrepreneurial philanthropy and its potentialities. The statistics published in 
rich lists and giving lists are of doubtful reliability, regularly exaggerating the extent of actual 
giving by confusing pledges with real transfers of wealth, and in any case offer only partial 
coverage. Until we have better data, we cannot know the real size or extent of the 
entrepreneurial philanthropy movement, and the suspicion must remain that the proportion of 
fortunes actually put to work philanthropically, both individually and collectively, falls far 
short of the Carnegie ideal. Are the likes of Gates, Buffet, Allen and Omidyar in effect 
providing a fig leaf behind which the majority of the super wealthy across the globe stands 
exposed? Answering this question will enable researchers to move beyond the idealistic, 
celebratory accounts of entrepreneurial philanthropy currently in circulation to explore more 
systematically the questions to which this article has suggested provisional answers. 
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Figure 1: Forms of Entrepreneurial Capital and the Accumulation Process 
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Figure 2: A Capital Theoretic Model of Entrepreneurial Philanthropy 
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Table 1: Andrew Carnegie’s Philanthropic Projects* 
 
Project 
Year 
Initiated 
Philanthropic Purpose 
Amount 
Invested  
($ Millions) 
Carnegie Corporation of New York 1911 
Support for higher education, libraries, 
research  and other Carnegie foundations 
125.000 
Libraries 1879 Provision of  public libraries (2,811) 60.365 
Carnegie Foundation for the 
Advancement of Teaching 
1905 Pensions for teachers in higher education 29.250 
Carnegie Institution of Washington 1902 Support for scientific research 22.300 
Colleges 1895 
Support for buildings and endowments of 
universities and colleges (500+) 
20.363 
Carnegie Institute of  Technology 
(Carnegie Mellon University)  
1900 
Provision of applied technological 
education  
13.531 
Carnegie Institute of Pittsburgh 1890 
Promotion of learning, scientific 
knowledge and cultural activities 
13.188 
Carnegie Hero Fund Commission 
and other hero funds 
1904 
Honour and reward citizens who risk 
their lives to save others in the United 
States and Europe 
10.540 
Carnegie Trust for the Universities of 
Scotland 
1901 
Support for Scottish universities and 
students 
10.000 
Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace 
1910 
Advancement of understanding between 
nations to promote peace 
10.000 
Carnegie United Kingdom Trust 1913 
Support for educational and social 
welfare provision in UK 
10.000 
Church organs 1873 Provision of church organs (7,689) 6.248 
Benefactions 1890 
Support for endowment funds and 
charities 
5.210 
Carnegie steel workers’ pensions 1901 Pensions for former employees 4.000 
Carnegie Dunfermline Trust 1903 Provision of public park and amenities 3.750 
Church Peace Union 1914 
Promotion of international peace and 
goodwill 
2.025 
Public buildings 1904 
Headquarters for organizations 
promoting  engineering and international 
cooperation 
1.550 
Hague Peace Palace 1903 Resolution of international disputes 1.500 
Steel town institutes 1901 
Promotion of learning and cultural 
activities 
1.000 
Simplified Spelling Board 1906 
Promotion of simplified spellings of 
common words 
0.280 
 
*Table based upon North, S.N. Ed. (1919). A Manual of the Public Benefactions of Andrew Carnegie, 
Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The total expenditure of $350.1 million, inflated by 
the United States consumer price index with 1901 (the year Carnegie cashed in his fortune) as base year, equates 
to $9.12 billion in 2009 prices: Officer, L.H. and Williamson, S.H.  ‘Purchasing Power of Money in the United 
States from 1774 to 2010’, MeasuringWorth, 2009. URL http://www.measuringworth.com/ppowerus/ 
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Table 2: Carnegie’s Investments in Cultural, Social and Symbolic Capital 
Form of Capital Methods of Accumulation Ways of Exploiting 
Cultural  Reading and research 
 Grand tours 
 Involvement in intellectual, 
cultural and political circles 
 Philanthropy 
 Seeing the bigger picture – 
opportunity recognition, strategy 
and tactics 
 Acceptance within the field of 
power 
 Winning important arguments 
 Legitimizing ruthless actions 
Social  Flattery and ingratiation 
 Entertaining and gift giving 
 Cultivation of friendships, 
associations and cliques within 
the field of power 
 Philanthropy 
 Inclusion and favours 
 Reciprocity and mutuality 
 Alliance building, power broking 
and deal making 
 Extending social networks 
Symbolic  Image building through 
writing, public speaking and 
media relations 
 Myth making 
 Demonstrating power and 
authority 
 Philanthropy 
 Holding sway over public and 
political opinions and sentiments 
 Attracting support, opportunities 
and approbation 
 Strengthening hand in 
negotiations 
 Demonstrating worthiness, 
distinction and virtue 
 
 
